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AN EFFECTIVE SMOKE SCREEN? - THE
MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION'S CIVIL COMPLAINT
AGAINST BIG TIME TOBACCO AND THE BATTLE OF
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Shelly Grunsted*
Introduction and Background
On June 25, 1997, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation (the Nation), its members
and citizens, by and through their Principal Chief, R. Perry Beaver, filed a
lawsuit' in the Nation's tribal court against the tobacco industry.2 In its
complaint, the Nation3 alleges that the tobacco industry injured the Nation
and its members by: (1) diminution of available health care dollars when
allocated health care dollars are expended treating smoking-related illnesses
and diseases; (2) increased health insurance premiums for its employees; and
(3) decreased productivity of its employees.4 The Nation contends that
tobacco products directly threaten the Nation's economic security because of
the expenditures the Nation must make to combat the illnesses related to
tobacco products! The Nation also alleges that the adverse health affects of
tobacco products on tribal members directly threaten the Nation's health and
welfare because tobacco products have been affirmatively linked to multiple
diseases and cancer.6 Further, the Nation contends that Defendant's tobacco
products have injurious health affects on the Nation's "full citizens,"7 and
*Second-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. American Tobacco Co., No. CV 97-27 (Muscogee (Creek)
Nation Tribal Ct. filed June 25, 1997).
2. The tobacco industry, as referenced in this article, refers to the following companies and
subsidiaries: American Tobacco Company c/o Brown & Williamson; RJ. Reynolds Tobacco
Company; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, individually and as successor by merger
to the American Tobacco Company; Philip Morris Incorporated; Lorillard Tobacco Company,
Lorillard Inc.; and United States Tobacco Company. On October 9, 1997, Petitioner filed a
voluntary dismissal of the four non-manufacturing defendants named in the original suit: Philip
Morris Company, Inc., UST, Inc., the Tobacco Institute, and the Council for Tobacco Research
U.S.A., Inc.
3. The Nation, as referenced in this article, includes: the Muscogee (Creek) Nation, its
members, citizens, and the Principal Chief, R. Perry Beaver, all located in northeastern Oklahoma.
4. See Petitioner's Complaint, Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. American Tobacco Co., No. CV
97-27, S1 17, 288 (Muscogee (Creek) Nation Tribal CL, filed June 25, 1997).
5. See Petitioner's Opposition to Motion for Protective Order at 4, American Tobacco Co.
(No. CV-97-27).
6. Id.
7. Full citizens of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation must have the requisite quantum of
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therefore, the tribe's political integrity is in jeopardy because only full citizens
are allowed to hold tribal offices.8
Part I addresses the Nation's tribal court structure. The progression starts
with the 1856 Treaty (Treaty of 1856) between the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
and the United States. It continues by discussing how the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act,9 passed by Congress in 1936, altered the Treaty of 1856. This
part proceeds to discuss how the Nation became a recognized independent
Indian community" with bylaws and a constitution governing the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation in Okmulgee, Oklahoma." The next part looks at the tribal
court's infrastructure. Finally, this part concludes with the operable provisions
of the Nation's Constitution and Judicial Code of 1982 which confer general
jurisdiction on the tribal court.
Part II discusses the Nation's case against the tobacco industry and why it
was filed. This part begins with allegations made in the complaint. The
complaint alleges negligence, fraud on the Nation's people, and detrimental
health affects to the Nation's people from tobacco products. The tobacco
settlement,12 proposed by various states' attorneys general and presented to
Congress, did not include the sovereign nations of the Indian communities in
Oklahoma or in any other State that has federally recognized Indian tribes.
The Nation was the first Indian tribe to file a lawsuit in response to being
overlooked by the tobacco settlement negotiations.
Part III outlines the tobacco industry's objections to being subjected to the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation's tribal court jurisdiction. The tobacco industry's
denial of jurisdiction stems from arguments that the Nation lacks tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants: (1) by treaty implications, or
alternatively, (2) because tribal jurisdiction is presumed not to exist according
to Montana,3 under its general rule denying jurisdiction to the tribal court
over nonmembers unless exceptions are available. 4
Part IV presents analysis of relevant United States Supreme Court subject
matter jurisdiction cases. 5 This part discusses the importance of the Montana
Muscogee (Creek) Indian blood (at least one-fourth), and are the only citizens eligible to hold
elected offices in the Nation. However, those citizens with less than the requisite blood quantum
may still participate in elections by voting. MusCoGEE (CREEK) NATION CONST. art. 3, § 4.
8. Id.
9. Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act, ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (1936) (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§
501-510 (1994)).
10. An independent Indian community is an Indian tribe that is federally recognized by the
Secretaty of the Interior.
11. This article is concerned with the Muscogee (Creek) Nation headquartered in Okmulgee
County, Oklahoma.
12. See infra note 80 for details of the tobacco settlement.
13. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
14. See Defendant's Memorandum at 2, American Tobacco Co. (No. CV 97-27).
15. This article deals only with subject matter jurisdiction with references to criminal
jurisdiction and does not discuss the aspects of in personarn jurisdiction.
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Rule"6 and its two exceptions, and how those exceptions apply in the Nation's
case. Finally, this part discusses the implications of the Strate v. A-i
Contractors7 decision handed down by the United States Supreme Court.
The final part discusses aspects of Public Law 280."8 Oklahoma is a non-
Public Law 280 state; thus, the State of Oklahoma would lack subject matter
jurisdiction over the current case or a case brought by an Indian against the
tobacco industry in state court. Therefore, a hypothetical comparison is made,
showing how tribal court jurisdiction is analogous to state court jurisdiction.
Consequently, this article concludes that the Nation retains tribal court subject
matter jurisdiction and the case should be adjudicated in that forum.
L Muscogee (Creek) Nation's Tribal Court Structure and Jurisdictional
Grants through Treaty and Statute
The United States, through treaties9 (especially the Treaty of 1856),
permitted the Nation jurisdiction over civil matters within tribal boundaries
between Indians, but not with "white men."' Therefore, the Treaty of 1856
divested the Muscogee (Creek) Nation of its jurisdictional powers over anyone
that was not a tribal member. In 1936, Congress enacted the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act (OIWA),2  which empowered the Nation to "organize for its
common welfare and to adopt a constitution and bylaws."' The Nation did
that in 1979 by creating the Nation's Constitution.' The Nation's Constitution
established three branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicialu
and took the same form as the United States Constitution. The Nation's
Constitution, set within the boundaries of the OIWA, confers on the tribal
courts, general jurisdiction over criminal and civil actions that occur within
the Muscogee (Creek) Nation's tribal boundaries.' The Nation's Constitution
was approved by the United States Secretary of the Interior' in 1979 and
became effective immediately.27
16. Montana, 450 U.S. at 544.
17. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994).
19. 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAwS AND TREATIES, at 25-29, 756-63, (Charles J. Kappler, ed.,
1904) (discussing Treaties of 1790 and 1856 signed by the United States Government and the
Muscogee (Creek) Nation); see Treaty with the Creeks, Aug. 7, 1790, 7 Stat. 35; Treaty with the
Creeks, Aug. 7, 1856, 11 Stat. 699.
20. Id. at 761.
21. Ch. 831, 49 Stat. 1967 (1936) (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-510 (1994)).
22. Id. § 503.
23. MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION Co ST. (Constitution Act, 1979). The Nation's Constitution
was approved by the Nation's members on October 6, 1979, by a vote of 1896 for and 1694
against.
24. Id. at art. 7 (establishing the judicial branch).
25. Id. at art. 7, § 206.
26. 25 U.S.C. § 503 (1994).
27. Id.
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The Nation further developed the Judicial Code of 1982' (Judicial Code)
as authorized under the Nation's Constitution. The district judge of the tribal
court hears juvenile, criminal, and civil cases. Issues of fact are tried before
the court or a jury' and issues of law are heard by the court?' The only
court of appeal in the Muscogee Nation is the Nation's Supreme Court."
There must be at least four supreme court justices sitting together as a body
to hear any appeal.3 In the Judicial Code, the Nation's district court has
"exclusive jurisdiction of all matters not otherwise limited to tribal
ordinance."33 The importance of the Nation's constitution and its judicial
code is that it brings the tobacco industry within the jurisdictional limits of the
Nation's tribal courts. No subsequent treaty or statute has lessened the effects
of the Nation's jurisdiction.
In Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Hodel,3' the federal court for the District
of Columbia stated that the OIWA and Black's Law Dictionary define
constitution to "encompass the power to create courts with general civil and
criminal jurisdiction."3 The court continued that inherent in self-government
is the power to make laws and to create mechanisms to enforce them, 6 citing
the Supreme Court case United States v. Wheeler.37 The court concluded that
by reasonable inference, the OIWA conferred all powers associated with self-
government, limited of course by statutes of general applicability." It
emerges from the discussion in the Hodel case that the OIWA is not displaced
by any other acts or statutes.39 Thus, the argument can be made that the
bylaws and Constitution of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation should stand
unfettered because Congress has not specifically legislated that Indian nations
do not have civil jurisdiction over non-Indian members on tribal lands.
28. Ordinance of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation adopting the Judicial Code of 1982 (Nat'l
Council Amend. 82-30), enacted Aug. 28, 1982 and effective Sept. 9, 1982.
29. Id. §§ 119-120.
30. Id. § 118.
31. Id. § 201.
32. Id. § 202.
33. Id. § 101(B) (emphasis added).
34. 851 F.2d 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
35. Id. at 1445.
36. Id.
37. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
38. Hodel, 851 F.2d at 1445 (emphasis added).
39. The Respondents argue in their brief that the court's opinion in Hodel does not suggest
that the limitations on tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians has been changed from the 1856 Treaty,
thus implying that the OIWA did not in fact give the Nation power to create the bylaws and
constitution of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation with civil jurisdiction over defendants. See
Defendant's Memorandum at 7, American Tobacco Co. (No. CV 97-27).
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II. Overview of Complaint CV 97-27 - Muscogee (Creek)
Nation v. American Tobacco Company
The Nation filed its original complaint against the tobacco industry setting
out numerous counts of negligent conduct against the tribe and its members.
The Nation alleges acts of conspiracy in a coverup by the industry to defraud
the Nation and its members into believing that tobacco products do not cause
adverse health risks. The Nation alleges that the welfare of the Nation is
directly affected because diseases and other illnesses related to tobacco
products have cost the Nation in health care dollars. The Nation relies on
industry studies and numerous reports to detail their case against the industry
in general.41 Most of the Nation's complaint is similar in shape and form,
from an informational and accusational position, to the forty states that have
filed litigation against the tobacco industry, including the State of Oklahoma.
However, the Nation is the first Indian Nation to file a complaint against the
tobacco industry 2
I1. The Tobacco Industry's Response to Being Subjected to Subject Matter
Jurisdiction in Tribal Court
The tobacco industry contested the Nation's tribal court jurisdiction on two
grounds. First, the tobacco industry argued that the grant of authority from the
OIWA never changed the Treaty of 1856, stating that tribal courts did not
have jurisdiction over "white men"'43 and, thus, the Nation did not have
jurisdiction in this case. Second, the tobacco industry plead in the alternative,
that even if jurisdiction was granted by the OIWA, the United States Supreme
Court had divested the Nation of its civil jurisdiction over non-Indian
defendants through rulings in Montana v. United States' and Strate v. A-i
Contractors!' The tobacco industry contended that they lacked consensual
relations with the Nation (first exception in Montana) and that the Nation
itself was not "directly" affected by the smoking of "some individuals"'47 of
the Nation and, therefore, the Nation's political integrity, health, or welfare
had not been harmed' (second exception in Montana).49 The tobacco
40. See Petitioners Complaint, American Tobacco Co. (No. CV 97-27), 11 17, 288.
41. Id.
42. To date, three tribes have filed complaints against the tobacco industry.
43. See Defendant's Memorandum of Points of Authorities in Support of Motion to Dismiss
at 7, American Tobacco Co. (No. CV 97-27).
44. 450 U.S. 544 (1980).
45. 117 S. Ct. 1404 (1997).
46. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
47. See Defendant's Memorandum at 7-9, American Tobacco Co. (No. CV 97-27).
48. Id.
49. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565.
No. 2]
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industry alleged that just because "some" members of the nation may have
been harmed, the second exception to the Montana rule cannot be invoked.
However, what the tobacco industry failed to address was a subsequent
holding, by the United States District Court in Montana, which recently
interpreted Montana's second exception. The second exception will be
triggered when there is "direct injury to a single tribal member and it takes
place on that member's reservation."" It is evident that this federal court did
not align with the position taken by the tobacco industry in this litigation.
IV. Tribal Jurisdiction of Non-Indian and Nonmember Defendants as seen
through Supreme Court Rulings
In United States v. Mazunie,5 the Supreme Court reiterated its holding in
Williams v. Lee,' that authority of tribal courts could extend general civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians, whose transactions on reservations with Indians
created causes of action' The Court continued that it [the Court] "has
consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their
reservations"' and that "if their power was to be taken away from them, it
was for Congress to do so."" The understanding of Mazunie is that unless
Congress has specifically legislated away jurisdictional authority from the
Nation, the Nation should still be vested with civil jurisdiction over the
tobacco industry because the harm took place on the Nation's land, through
the tobacco industry's transactions of marketing, targeting, advertising,
distributing, and selling their products to tribal members.
Arguably, the single -most influential Supreme Court ruling defining
inherent sovereignty of tribal courts over non-Indians is Montana v. United
States.' Montana stands for the general proposition that the inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of
nonmembers of the tribe.' However, the Court in Montana realized that
Indian tribes do retain some civil jurisdiction over nonmembers and delineated
two exceptions to its general rule." The first exception stated that "a tribe
may regulate, through taxation, licensing or other means, the activities of
nonmembers who enter into consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other
50. Montana v. Bremmer, 971 F. Supp 436, 438 (D. Mont. 1997) (emphasis added).
51. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
52. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
53. Mazunie, 419 U.S. at 557.
54. Id.
55. Id
56. 450 U.S. 544 (1980).
57. Id. at 565.
58. Id.
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arrangements."" The Court's second exception "is when the conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security or the health or welfare of the tribe."'
In citing its two exceptions, the Montana Court cited cases to which it felt
the exceptions might apply. The first exception cited to Williams v. Lee;"
Morris v. Hitchcock;' Buster v. Wright;' and Washington v. Confederated
Tribes of Colville Indian Reservations.' Each case shows that the
defendant's relationship with the Indian plaintiff was a consensual relationship
and the conduct at issue in the preceding cases was either contractual or
through commercial dealings.' The tobacco industry alleges that they have
no relationship, consensual or otherwise, with the Nation to be brought under
the first Montana exception.' Nevertheless, the tobacco industry voluntarily
advertised, distributed and sold its tobacco products within the Muscogee
Nation's stream of commerce within tribal boundaries. The tobacco industry
also knew that its products were being used by Indians within the Nation,
because the industry continued to distribute its products in the Nation's stores,
smoke shops, gas stations, and restaurants and continued to do so even after
the tobacco industry became aware of harmful effects of smoking and the
numerous health risks associated with tobacco products.'
The second Montana exception' cited to Fisher v. District Court;'
Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County;"0 Williams v. Lee;7 and
Thomas v. Gay.' Each case analyzed whether a state or territory asserting
jurisdiction would unduly harm the political integrity of the tribal court's
jurisdiction if the actions were not maintained in tribal arenas.3 It is obvious
that the Muscogee Nation's political integrity would be endangered if
jurisdiction is not maintained in the tribal court because the Nation's tribal
court is best able to ascertain and apply the Nation's law to the litigation. The
Nation's health and welfare would also be damaged if the case were not
maintained in the tribal court because any other forum: (1) would be unable
to adjudicate the litigation based on the Nation's bylaws and constitution, and
59. Id.
60. IeL at 566 (emphasis added).
61. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
62. 194 U.S. 384 (1904).
63. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905).
64. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
65. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1407 (1997).
66. See Defendant's Brief at 7, 8, American Tobacco Co. (No. CV 97-27).
67. See Nation's Complaint passim, American Tobacco Co. (No. CV 97-27).
68. Montana, 405 U.S. at 565-66.
69. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
70. 200 U.S. 118 (1906).
71. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
72. 169 U.S. 264 (1898).
73. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1407 (1997).
No. 2]
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(2) may not be as expedient, precise, or strive to achieve equality in any
possible settlement negotiations. Furthermore, because the tobacco industry
conspired to keep the adverse health affects and risks associated with tobacco
use from the public and the Muscogee Nation, the Nation's welfare and health
has been unduly harmed.
In the Nation's case against the tobacco industry, it appears both exceptions
could apply. First, the tobacco industry entered into consensual relationships
with the tribe and its members by allowing product advertising in newspapers,
magazines, and billboards within the Nation's boundaries, and by allowing the
distribution and sale of its products in the tobacco shops and retail
establishments. Second, the Nation can also argue that these relationships
were consensual because the tobacco industry knew that its products were
within the Muscogee Nation's stream of commerce due to continued sales and
advertisements in the region and that the tobacco industry targeted and
marketed in this area, especially to the Muscogee Nation's children by such
advertising gimmicks as Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man. In the settlement
agreement between the tobacco industry and states' attorneys general, it agreed
not to continue advertising with Joe Camel or the Marlboro Man since there
were so many reports that the industry's advertising and marketing efforts
were aimed at teens.74
The second exception to the Montana rule, however, offers the better
argument. The second exception pertains to conduct that threatens or has
some direct effect on the Tribe's political integrity, economic security or the
Tribe's health or welfare' With this exception, the Nation can argue that
health, welfare, and the political integrity of the tribe is at risk if the tobacco
litigation is not sustained in the tribal court. First, the repayment of past and
future costs to the Nation for substantial health care disbursements for its
employees and members is in jeopardy if the tobacco industry is allowed to
dismiss the claim. Reports and national studies indicate that smoking tobacco
products has been linked to various diseases, including cancers of the mouth,
lungs, larynx, esophagus, pancreas, kidney, and other vital organs." Tobacco
and tobacco products are also linked to other diseases such as emphysema and
severe upper respiratory afflictions and are also attributable to some stroke
and heart attack victims deteriorated conditions Particularly disturbing is
the fact that smoking is being linked to pregnancy problems, including
miscarriage, low birth weight babies, and abnormalities of the fetus.7 These
74. See supra note 80 for details of settlement agreement.
75. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
76. American Cancer Society Study Finds the Incidence of Adenocarianoma of the Lung is
Increasing (visited Jan. 22, 1998) <http://www.cancer.org/media/story1 10497.html>.
77. Id.
78. Marjorie R. Sable & Allen A. Herman, The Relationship Between Prenatal Health
Behavior Advice and Low Birth Weight, 112 PUB. HEALTH REP. 332 (1997).
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health problems are not unique to any one set of American citizens. However,
it is estimated by the Center for Disease Control that 40% of all adult Native
American and Alaskan Indians smoke an average of twenty-five or more
cigarettes a day.7 Therefore, if civil jurisdiction is not maintained in the
tribal court, it is possible that the Nation will not be in control of its own
destiny and may be lost in the shuffle in any settlement agreement that the
tobacco industry has agreed to with the other States in the Union.'
Any settlement agreement currently being addressed in Congress and the
White House may circumvent any settlement attempts by the Nation or the
tobacco industry. It is evident from the Congressional Record8" that the
Indian Nations were not apprised of, or a party to, any settlement agreements.
Thus, the Nation's political interests were not protected in the settlement
negotiations which could directly affect the Muscogee Nation's political
integrity, because no representation by the Nation or any other Indian Nation
at the initial settlement negotiations meant the Indian Nations did not have
any say in how the settlement money would be appropriated. The Indian
Nations would be forced to comply with any agreement the states' attorneys
79. See infra note 80.
80. On June 20, 1997,40 states, led by Mississippi Attorney General, Mike Moore, and the
tobacco industry came to a settlement agreement. This proposed agreement included a $368.5
billion dollar trust fund (established and funded by the tobacco industry) over the next 25 years
to fund damage claims, treatment projects and health care costs to smokers. The parties also
agreed to new advertising criteria, which included the abandonment of advertising on billboards,
store promotions and displays, and over the Internet. The agreement also eliminated the use of
Joe Camel and the Marlboro Man as icons of the industry that induced younger American's to
think that smoking was "cool." The agreement also called for the FDA to have regulatory
authority over tobacco products. The tobacco industry in agreeing to these stipulations would be
relieved from future class action law suits unless the class action suits currently pending settled
before legislation was enacted. This agreement was put before Congress and the White House;
however, President Bill Clinton refused to sign the agreement because he felt the agreement was
not strong enough in deterring the American young from smoking. On November 13, Sen. Orrin
Hatch (R.-Utah) proposed Senate Bill 1530, titled "Placing Restraints on Tobacco's Endangerment
of Children and Teens Act" (PROTECTS Act). This bill proposes to enact the settlement
agreement as offered with a few added provisions. Ironically, the bill calls for specific Native
American and Alaskan Indian provisions. These provisions stem from an October 6, 1997,
oversight hearing on the tobacco settlement by the Committee on Indian Affairs. Senator Hatch,
being present at the meeting, proposed these new provisions. He noted that the Indian Health
Services testified that in some parts of the country 80% of Native American high school students
either smoke or chew tobacco. Testimony included a report from the Center for Disease Control
that estimates 40% of all adult American and Alaskan Indians smoke an average of 25 or more
cigarettes a day. In light of this information, Senator Hatch stated that provisions would be made
in his proposed bill to ensure that tribal governments would have regulatory authority to address
issues of health concerns and continue to maintain the sovereign authority over activities
occurring on reservations. The proposed legislation will be debated upon Congress' return to
session in January. 143 CONG. REc. S12,576-602 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997) (statement of Sen.
Hatch).
81. Id.
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general and tobacco industry made, possibly losing out on any settlement
money for their respective tribes altogether.
Secondly, if subject matter jurisdiction is not retained in tribal court and
the case is dismissed or removed to federal court, the Nation will lose the
opportunity to apply its own laws for the welfare and political integrity of its
people. This would leave the Nation at the mercy of a different court in
adjudicating a claim that by all rights should be adjudicated in the Muscogee
Nation's tribal courts. Third, if the case is taken out of the Nation's
jurisdiction, it defeats the purpose of having a tribal court and tribal self-
government by ignoring the treaties the United States signed with the
Muscogee Nation. It would also defeat provisions of the Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act, which gave the Nation power to establish a constitution and
bylaws, by ripping from them, the very power these provisions gave the
Nation to adjudicate a case such as this. Also, the federal government's policy
is to promote tribal self-government.'
Finally, if the Nation's tribal court is not allowed to adjudicate the case on
the merits in its own court, the political integrity of the Nation will have taken
a severe blow to its status as a sovereign who has the right to control
commerce and actions resulting from negligence in commerce. The
adjudication process would be meaningless to subsequent potential tortfeasors.
Montana left open a question, however. The Court stated that the issue
before the court was a "regulatory issue" and a very narrow one at that." In
being a regulatory issue, that means that the Supreme Court did not address
the question of whether civil (subject matter) jurisdiction was to fall under the
general rule or any of the exceptions. Five years after deciding Montana, the
Supreme Court heard and decided National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v.
Crow Tribe of Indians.' In National Farmers, the Court held that
Oliphant" could not be stretched to a case concerning civil jurisdiction.'
The Court stated that there is no comparable legislation granting the federal
courts jurisdiction over civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians that
arise on Indian reservations." Congress extended criminal jurisdiction to the
federal courts instead of tribal courts, but, the Court continued, "by all
possible rules of construction the inference is clear that jurisdiction is left to
the Choctaw themselves of civil controversies arising strictly within the
Choctaw Nation."' The National Farmers Court concluded that whether a
82. See generally Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987) (explaining that the
federal governmentfs long-standing policy is to encourage tribal self-government).
83. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1980).
84. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
85. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that Indian tribal
courts did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants) (emphasis added).
86. National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 854.
87. Id.
88. Ia at 855.
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tribal court has the power to exercise civil subject matter jurisdiction is not
foreclosed by an extension of the Oliphant rule." The Court cautioned that
it must first look to see if there are any relevant statutes, Executive Branch
policies embodied in treaties, or any other administrative or judicial decisions,
to determine if a tribal court's jurisdiction has been altered, divested, or
diminished.'
National Farmers then seems to stand for the assumption that a tribal court
will continue to have civil jurisdiction unless specific treaty provisions,
statutes, or court rulings have stripped it of its jurisdiction. The Nation has
not been divested of its civil jurisdiction by any treaty or statute, quite the
contrary. The Nation was given authority in the 1936 Oklahoma Indian
Welfare Act to establish and maintain bylaws, statutes and a constitution.
Further, the Montana rule and its two exceptions reference regulatory
jurisdiction and not civil jurisdiction. In the litigation before the Nation, the
Nation is not exercising regulatory powers. Therefore, the Nation has civil
jurisdiction over the tobacco industry to hear the case in question.
Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante,9  decided in 1987, confirms the
holding in National Farmers because the Supreme Court again recognizes the
federal government's long-standing policy of encouraging tribal self-
government.' Iowa Mutual also reiterated that tribal courts are subject to
extensive limitations when criminal jurisdiction is invoked" per Oliphant, but
that "civil jurisdiction does not have such stringent limitations."' The Court
continued in Iowa Mutual that they [the Court] "refused to foreclose tribal
court jurisdiction over a dispute involving a non-Indian."95 It stands to reason
then that the Supreme Court has not disparaged the Muscogee (Creek) Nation
of its civil jurisdiction over the tobacco litigation currently pending. Although
Iowa Mutual is seen as an exhaustion rule,' it still stands to reason that the
Nation's tribal court has direct authority to establish its general subject matter
jurisdiction over the litigation.
Iowa Mutual also stands for the proposition that no matter what type of
civil jurisdiction is invoked (federal question or diversity of citizenship),'
89. Id.
90. Id. at 855-56.
91. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
92. Id. at 14.
93. Id. at 15.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. The Supreme Court in Iowa Mutual stated that (as in National Farmers) the "tribal legal
institutions require that they be given a 'full opportunity' to consider the issues before them and
to 'rectify any errors.'" The Court continued, "at a minimum, exhaustion of tribal remedies means
that tribal appellate courts must have the opportunity to review the determinations of the lower
tribal courts." Id. at 16-17. This has become known as the "exhaustion rule." See also infra note
104.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (federal question); id. § 1332 (as amended 1996) (diversity).
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federal policy supporting tribal self-government directs a federal court to stay
out of the dispute until a tribal court has had the opportunity to determine its
own jurisdiction If this is not the policy, the Court stated, the defendants
would be able to have unlimited access to the federal courts and would impair
the tribal court authority over reservation affairs." The Court continued that
the adjudication of such matters by non-tribal courts also infringes upon tribal
lawmaking authority because the tribal courts are the best interpreters of tribal
laws and how they should be applied." °
Iowa Mutual also reiterated that tribal court's jurisdiction over non-Indians
on reservation lands is an important part of tribal sovereignty."0 ' "Civil
jurisdiction over activities of non-Indians lies in tribal courts unless Congress
has limited jurisdiction by a federal statute or there is a specific treaty
provision."'" Most importantly, the Court stated that "because the Tribe
retains all inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the
federal government, the proper inference from silence is that the sovereign
power remains intact."" Accordingly, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation has its
sovereign powers intact and, therefore, has civil jurisdiction over the tobacco
industry. The Supreme Court has applied an exhaustion rule"° in non-Indian
defendant's cases versus individual Indians or Indian nations, but in so ruling,
the Court has not divested the tribal courts of civil jurisdiction.
One of the major cases that the tobacco industry cites to challenge the
Nation's jurisdiction is Strate v. A-1 Contractors."S In Strate, the Supreme
Court reiterated its holding in Montana and its two exceptions."° The Court
concluded, however, that National Farmers and Iowa Mutual "[we]re not at
odds with, and d[id] not displace, Montana."'" Strate held that a "tribe's
adjudicative jurisdiction d[id] not exceed its legislative jurisdiction."" The
Court also stated that subject to controlling provisions in treaties and statutes,
and the two exceptions identified in Montana, the civil authority of Indian
tribes and their courts with respect to non-Indian fee lands generally does not
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe °9
However, because the Nation's complaint alleges that the harm caused by
98. Iowa Mutal, 480 U.S. at 16.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Td. at 18.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. A defendant must exhaust all tribal remedies from the tribal court level through the
appellate process and the tribal supreme court, if applicable, before a defendant may seek review
by a federal (or state) court.
105. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 117 S. Ct. 1404, 1404 (1997).
106. Id. at 1413.
107. Id. at 1410.
108. Id. at 1413.
109. Id.
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the non-Indian defendants (the tobacco industry) was on tribal land within
tribal jurisdiction, which the Nation's bylaws and constitution control, civil
jurisdiction does continue to exist as against the Defendant tobacco
companies. This is so because the Court's exceptions in Montana apply to the
litigation at hand. Strate, confirmed Montana's general rule and two
exceptions and held that Iowa Mutual and National Farmers did not extend
or displace Montana. Thus, Strate did not take away the Nation's
jurisdictional grounds for hearing the case. Civil jurisdiction still exists for the
Nation's tribal court to hear the litigation.
Strate did state that a "tribes adjudicative jurisdiction d[id] not exceed its
legislative jurisdiction;""' however, the Nation would not exceed its
legislative jurisdiction because legislative jurisdiction is "exclusive jurisdiction
over all matters not otherwise limited to tribal ordinance."' The Supreme
Court continues in Strate that "we 'can readily agree' in accord with Montana
that tribes retain considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal
land."". The issue in Strate concerns two non-Indians having an accident
on a highway running through tribal property. However, the present litigation
between the Nation and the tobacco industry is readily distinguishable.
Jurisdiction lies with the Nation's tribal court to hear the litigation because the
harm alleged in the complaint is by non-member conduct on tribal lands
against members of the Nation.
V. Oklahoma as a Non-Public Law 280 State
Public Law 280" establishes states that have jurisdictional authority over
Indians and Indian lands within their territory. Oklahoma opted not to become
a Public Law 280 state."" In not becoming a Public Law 280, the state has
opted not to exercise civil jurisdiction over any Indian tribal matter."' In
Indian Country U.S.A., Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission,'6 the Tenth
Circuit discussed the concept of "Indian Country":
The touchstone for allocating authority among the various
governments has been the concept of "Indian Country," a legal
term delineating the territorial boundaries of federal, state and
tribal jurisdiction. Historically, the conduct of Indians and
interests in Indian property within Indian Country have been
matters of federal and tribal concern. Outside Indian Country,
110. d
111. MuscoGEE (CREEK) NATION CONST. § 206 (Constitution Act, 1979).
112. Strate, 117 S. Ct. at 1413 (citations omitted).
113. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994).
114. IM
115. See OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
116. 829 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1987).
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state jurisdiction has obtained."7
It is clear that from this discussion by the court that jurisdiction lies within
the tribal courts even within the State of Oklahoma. The court explained that
Congress has the authority to define Indian country and in so doing also may
exclude state jurisdiction."' Therefore, it is important to note that relief for
tribal members will not come at the State level since the State of Oklahoma
does not have jurisdiction to hear a claim brought by an Indian suing the
tobacco industry to obtain a money judgment as a result of any tobacco
settlement the State may make.
The hypothetical argument can be made that the Nation's tribal court has
the same civil jurisdictional grants as the State of Oklahoma."' Therefore,
the tribal court should be afforded the same opportunity to adjudicate the
claim brought by the Nation against the tobacco industry.'
VI. Conclusions and Final Thoughts
The pending matter before the Nation's tribal court is whether the court has
civil jurisdiction to hear the claims the Nation has brought against the tobacco
industry. Montana v. United States is the controlling precedent for this
litigation with its two exceptions to the general rule that tribal courts do not
have juiisdiction over non-Indian defendants. First, the tobacco industry and
the Nation have consensual commercial dealings through the buying and
selling of tobacco products on tribal lands. Secondly, the marketing, targeting,
advertising, and selling of tobacco products directly influences the Nation's
citizens and its political integrity, health, and welfare in so far as the proven
harmful health effects of tobacco products have caused increased health care
costs, diminution in service of the Nation's employees, and increased tobacco
related illnesses which can cause death. It is therefore important to the
integrity of the Nation, its members and citizens, that this litigation proceed
in the tribal forum.'
117. Id. at 973 (citing Ahboah v. Housing Auth. of the Kiowa Tribe, 660 P.2d 625, 627
(Okla. 1983)).
118. Id. at 974.
119. See generally Oklahoma Enabling Act of June 16, 1906, Pub. L. No. 234, 34 Stat. 267.
120. See supra note 78. In proposed Senate Bill 1530, Senator Hatch states that Indian
nations would be treated just like states in any agreements made with the tobacco industry.
121. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case of the Kiowa Tribe
of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Techs., cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997). Oral arguments
were heard on January 12, 1998, addressing sovereign immunity of Indian Nations.
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